Table of Contents



The Gulf War:

Overreaction & Excessiveness

By Hassan A El-Najjar

Amazone Press, 2001

The Root of Subsequent US Invasion of the Middle East

How America was dragged into conflict

 with the Arab and Muslim worlds





     On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait as a culmination of developments that spanned a century. In response, the United States led a coalition of 31 countries that forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The 1991 Gulf War that reversed the Iraqi invasion resulted in killing hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers in addition to thousands of Palestinian and Arab civilians after the War. Throughout the decade that followed the war, Iraq has been kept under an embargo and a strict regime of economic sanctions that have resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of children. So, why did Iraq invade Kuwait, in the first place? What happened to warrant all these deaths? Why was Iraq destroyed, instead of just being forced to reverse its invasion? And why did the Bush administration insist on the use of force instead of sanctions, despite major Congressional opposition?

     Many books have been published about different aspects of the 1991 Gulf War. However, most of them were biased, viewing the issue from an anti-Iraqi perspective. This book is different in that it is more objective, particularly in uncovering the way the crisis was handled and the war was executed. In addition, it explains the crisis as a historical development instead of just dealing with it as if it is an accidental event or a chaotic eruption that disturbed the world order. It also addresses the basic aspects of the crisis and the war that were not addressed by most of the previous books. The end outcome is that the real story of the Gulf War is revealed in a way that respects readers' intelligence. Furthermore, the conflict is explained in relation to inter-Arab politics as well as Arab-Western relations. A special emphasis throughout the book is on how and why America became involved in the conflict. Finally, this book is unique in three main ways. First, it is critical of the way the Bush administration handled the crisis and the War. Second, it points to the special relationship between the American power elite and the Gulf absolute monarchies. Third, the author is an Arab-American who lived in the Gulf region as well as in the United States. This has enabled him to provide readers with insights from the Arab and American dimensions, which is missing from the experiences of most authors.

     Proponents of the 1991 Gulf War claimed that it was fought to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to put an end to the ambitions of the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussain, who was described as Hitler.[1] These claims will be investigated in relation to the other more important goals of the war. More specifically, the following main questions will be investigated. First, was the War really fought to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or to reassert the hegemonic position of the three major Western powers: the U.S., Britain, and France, in the region? Second, who were the War constituents? Was not the destruction of Iraq a goal in itself? Was not the War an opportunity to justify continuous militarism, particularly in the U.S.? Finally, was not the War an opportunity to strengthen the position of the ruling families in the Gulf and provide them with direct Western protection from their rivals, Arab nationalists?

     Most authors did not analyze the process through which America went to the War. In particular, the role of bureaucrats in the administration, known as Middle East experts, was not explored in the vast majority of the works written about the War. An important part of the investigation in this book is about these experts. Who are they? How did they influence President George Bush, his Secretary of State, James Baker, and the National Security Council in making the major decisions before and during the crisis and the War? In particular, the role of these experts in branding Iraq as an adversary well before the invasion will be investigated.[2] Then how did they influence decision- making during the second meeting of the National Security Council, after the Iraqi invasion? By investigating influence of these experts on the President, the discussion will extend to several related areas, such as national interests, the presidency, and democracy in America.

     Concerning the War itself, the book investigates and analyzes basic questions that were rarely addressed by other authors. In particular, was the administration reluctant to go to war or was it determined to launch it? Was the administration willing to accept a peaceful solution or was it insistent on denying Iraq any chance to withdraw without fighting? Finally, did the War stop when the Iraqis were forced out of Kuwait, or did it continue unnecessarily?


So, What Is This Book All About?


                  These questions are going to be answered in the relevant chapters of the book. Readers are going to see how the Bush administration handled the crisis and the war in the Gulf. By investigating and analyzing these questions and the related issues, the real story of the Gulf War is revealed. So, this book is about providing readers with information and analyses that have not been provided by other works about the Gulf War.

     In Chapter I, the Iraqi claims of Kuwait will be investigated, shedding some light on the special relationship between the two states, which is usually underestimated as a main factor that contributed to the crisis. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was described as caused by border disputes and disagreement over oil prices.[3] While this was true, it would not warrant an invasion. There was a special relationship between Iraq and Kuwait that led Iraqis to take such action. Throughout the 20th century, Iraq has claimed Kuwait as an Iraqi territory. In fact, the 1990 invasion was the fourth Iraqi attempt to restore Kuwait.[4] Iraqis have always felt that it is the duty of Kuwaitis to support Iraq. They expected Kuwaiti support during and after the Iran-Iraq war. The crisis started when the Kuwaiti government began asking Iraq to pay back the war debt. Then, the crisis was more deepened when Kuwaitis did not concede to the Iraqi border demands and did not respond to the Iraqi appeals to stop their overproduction of oil. Thus, Chapter I focuses on the special relationship between Iraq and Kuwait, as a necessary background to understand the crisis and the War.

                  Chapter II focuses on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in order to clarify the indispensable role that Saudis played during the crisis and the War. During the first few hours of the Iraqi invasion, the Kuwaiti government and the royal family took refuge in Saudi Arabia. Saudis also supported Kuwaitis by their decision to receive and finance the coalition troops. But why did Saudi Arabia take the Kuwaiti side? It is true that the Bush administration persuaded the Saudis to take that stance.[5] But there was another important factor. The Kuwaiti and Saudi royal families have been allies throughout the 20th century. In 1901, the ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah, supported Abdul Aziz Al-Saud to restore the rule of his family over Nejd. Saudis paid back this debt first in 1961 when they supported Kuwait during the third Iraqi attempt to restore it. Then, Saudi-Kuwaiti relations were strengthened when both states joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in 1981.[6] Nevertheless, relations between them have not always been friendly. There have been border disputes and even fighting in some occasions.[7]

                  In Chapter III, the relationship between Kuwaitis and immigrants in Kuwait is investigated. In particular, mistreatment of immigrants is analyzed in order to help readers understand how Kuwaitis are perceived in the region. The Kuwaiti insensitivities concerning Iraqi grievances, particularly insisting on debt repayment and overproduction of oil, were not isolated from an overall Kuwaiti way of thinking and treatment of others. Immigrants in Kuwait were systematically discriminated against socially, economically, and politically through denying them permanent-resident status and citizenship.[8] Although Kuwait is not the only Arab state that followed this policy toward immigrants, it was unique in doing so for three major reasons. First, Kuwait had a large population group of non-citizens who had no citizenship of any other country, known as Bedoons. These were exploited by the Kuwaiti government, which hired them in the lowest-paying jobs in the police and the armed forces without giving them a legal status in the country.[9] Second, Kuwait had the largest Palestinian immigrant community outside Palestine and Jordan. Despite the fact that Palestinians started to come to Kuwait in the 1930s and participated in building the country, they were also discriminated against. Like the Bedoons and other immigrants, they were denied permanent-resident status and citizenship.[10] Third, the Kuwaiti discriminatory policies led to the material and psychological separation between immigrants and citizens. This led to a mutual distrust and suspicion that escalated to persecution of the Palestinians and the Bedoons, after the war.[11] The irony was that despite mistreatment of these two population groups before the war, the Kuwaiti government expected them to be more loyal than Kuwaitis themselves. They were blamed for staying and working in the country during the period of the Iraqi rule. Unlike Kuwaitis, they could neither leave nor stop working. As a result, they were made scapegoats after the war by accusing them of collaboration with the Iraqi authorities.[12] While Kuwaiti discriminatory policies and their consequences are discussed in Chapter III, the terror campaign against Palestinians after the war is the subject of Chapter X.

                  In Chapter IV, the conflict is analyzed within an inter-Arab context. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis developed as a result of the fact that the ruling elites in the two Arab states represented two conflicting ideologies. In this inter-Arab conflict, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party represented an ideology close to socialist ideologies in Western societies. The ruling class in Kuwait represented a quasi-feudal ideology according to which members of the royal family control the country=s major resources, allow their loyal subjects to have access to them, and deny them to others. While followers of different ideologies, such as liberalism and conservatism in the United States and other industrial societies, alternate the exercise of power peacefully by accepting results of elections, this has not happened yet in the Arab Middle East. Some Arab states do not have multi-party elections, others do not have elections at all. In addition to that, rivalry between Arab states intensifies these ideological differences. Consequently, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can be better understood if it is analyzed as a result of a conflict between two different ideologies in the absence of a unified and democratic Arab homeland.

                  Chapter V analyzes the role of Western interests in the development of the crisis and the War. The Gulf War has demonstrated that the power elites in the West are willing to go to a major war in order to secure their interests in the Gulf. They considered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a threat to their oil interests. However, Iraq was targeted by hostility from the West for a long time. In order for Western interests to be protected, successive Iraqi governments have been kept busy fighting with their Kurdish minority, throughout the twentieth century. Between 1922 and 1975, Iraqi Kurds revolted several times against the Iraqi central government receiving assistance first from the British then from the United States and Israel.[13] Peace in Iraq lasted only about five years, between 1975 and 1980, then the Iran-Iraq war started and continued until 1988. That war was closely related to the Kurdish problem because it started as a result of canceling the 1975 Iraqi-Iranian treaty, which ended the Kurdish rebellion.[14]

     By the time the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iraq was about $90 billion in debt and in need for money to rebuild its economy.[15] The decline in oil prices did not help the Iraqi plans for reconstruction. Thus, the 1990 economic distress, that Iraq found itself in, was caused originally by the eight-year war with Iran and the longer war with the Kurds.

     In addition to oil interests, the Western power elites have an interest in keeping militarism alive and well. For a few months, in 1989 and 1990, the downfall of the Soviet Union deprived the military industries in the West from the major justification of keeping the military spending as high as possible. In the United States, people even started talking about peace dividends. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a golden opportunity for the military industries and their constituents among the power elites to argue for the continuation of the high military spending. Thus, as one Cold War was over, another was aggressively argued for. After all, the Cold War was a big business. In the United States alone, the cost of the Cold War reached about $12.8 trillion between 1945 and 1990.[16]

                  Chapter VI deals with the 1990 crisis that led to the invasion. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait have been tense throughout the twentieth century. However, tensions increased during the five main crises of 1901, 1902, 1938, 1961, and 1990. Only the last crisis escalated to an Iraqi invasion. When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Kuwaitis felt the need to avoid future problems with Iraq. To achieve that, they demanded an Iraqi recognition of the borders between the two states.[17] When Iraq did not agree, they retaliated by exerting economic pressures. They demanded repayment of the $12 billion war debt. Then, they increased their oil production, thus violating the OPEC quota, and contributing to a 30 percent decline in the oil prices.[18] Feeling these economic pressures, the Iraqis responded by sending troops to the border. When the Jeddah talks failed to resolve the disputes, the stage was set for the Iraqi invasion.[19]

     The Arab initial reaction to the invasion was a mixture of shock and disbelief. Therefore, it took the form of diplomatic initiatives demanding the Iraqi withdrawal. However, the tough positions of the U.S. and the U.K. in the United Nations and their pressures on some Arab states led the Arab League to condemn the invasion and demand an instant Iraqi withdrawal. The turning point was when King Fahd agreed to receive American troops in his country.[20] That was the first step toward the eviction of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the destruction of Iraq during the war.

      The Bush administration contributed to the crisis by leading the Iraqis to believe that it would not interfere in the dispute. On July 23, 1990, the U.S. State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, said that the U.S. “had no defense treaties with Kuwait; no special defense or security commitment to Kuwait.”[21] Two days later, on July 25, Ambassador April Glaspie assured the Iraqi President that the U.S. was not going to interfere in “inter-Arab disputes.”[22]

       Europeans and Israelis also contributed to the escalation of the crisis by making the Iraqis nervous. First, the Iraqis began to fear an imminent Israeli attack on their nuclear installations. Second, an anti-Iraq media campaign spread all over Europe and North America because of the Iraqi counter-threats against Israel.[23] Then, European countries started intercepting industrial shipments purchased by Iraq for fear that these shipments may be used in making the Babylon Super-Gun, which may threaten the Israeli military superiority in the Middle East. Third, Israeli agents assassinated the Canadian designer and builder of the Super-Gun, Gerald Bull.[24]

     One of the most important aspects of the Gulf War was how the war decision was made. It took President Bush less than two days to conclude that Iraq was wrong. Neither the Congress nor the media contemplated seriously on the possibility that Kuwaitis were as responsible for the escalation of the crisis as Iraqis were. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was considered as a disruption of the world order. However, the Kuwaiti disruption of the oil markets, which led to the sharp decline in oil prices, was ignored. The unique relationship between Kuwait and Iraq was also ignored despite the fact that the relationship between them is very similar to the relationship between Syria and Lebanon. Such relationship allowed Syria to send its troops to Lebanon and stay there without serious regional or international objections. Finally, in concluding that Iraq was wrong, the Bush administration ignored the historical background of the inter-Arab conflict.

     President Bush found himself between the Thatcher anvil and hammers of the hawks in his administration. All of them demanded a tough stand against Iraq. Margaret Thatcher gave him a lecture in colonial history and how she defeated Argentina in the Falkland War, a few years earlier.[25] Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Dick Cheney, and their assistants, particularly Richard Haass, Larry Eagleburger, and Dennis Ross, hammered him to take a strong stance against the invasion.[26] As Chapter VI reveals, these pressures led President Bush to choose war over sanctions.

     Once the war decision was made in the first few days after the invasion, the Bush administration started preparation for war. Troops were sent to Saudi Arabia after convincing Saudis that they were in danger.[27] The coalition was built and the necessary U.N. resolutions were passed using the Bakerian diplomacy of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and buying votes.[28] This is the emphasis of Chapter VII, which documents the Bush administration’s rejection of all peace initiatives, dismissing them as a “linkage”[29]. It also analyzes the role of Congress, particularly the attempt of Democrats to avoid the War.

     While all this was being done, the basic right of the American people to know the truth concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis was not observed by the Bush administration and its supporters in Congress. When they held Congressional hearings, they did not give a fair chance to sociologists, historians, and history-oriented political scientists who are experts on the Middle East. This deprived Congress and the American people of understanding the social and historical backgrounds that contributed to the development of the crisis. Hearings conducted by supporters of the administration were biased and aimed at charging the American people emotionally against Iraq. In one hearing, Iraqis were accused of throwing Kuwaiti infants out of their incubators in a hospital and taking the medical equipment to Iraq. Several media investigative reports after the war demonstrated that this never happened. Interviews were conducted with the director and doctors of the Kuwaiti hospital who said that they hid the medical equipment in the basement of the building during the crisis and the war.[30]

     The “war or peace” debate was ruled out in the first few days of the crisis. Few opportunities were given in Congress to experts who would argue for resolving the crisis peacefully, through negotiations, or by the use of economic sanctions. In fact, there was a real need for other experts who would educate the American people and their representatives about the history of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations. However, those who tried to give experts a chance to argue for economic sanctions instead of war, like Senator Sam Nunn, were criticized, as documented in Chapter VIII.

                  In spite of that, Sam Nunn continued his efforts to educate the administration, the Congress, and the public about the origins and consequences of the Gulf crisis. He started a series of televised Senate hearings on September 11 and 13, November 27-30, and December 3, on the U.S. Gulf policy, posing questions on the use of sanctions. He argued that the U.S. should stick to sanctions for up to two years, if necessary. His position attracted the support of many Democrats. During the hearings, he called seventeen government officials, retired senior military officers, and experts to testify.[31] The vast majority of the witnesses spoke out against the use of force because sanctions would do the job if they were given the chance to work.

     However, the Bush administration succeeded in containing opposition in Congress in preparation for war against Iraq. Expecting that the war would be horrendous in its consequences, the Iraqi President called it "the Mother of All Battles" (Chapter IX). Although Iraq was defeated, the war still deserves that description, at least within an Arab context. It was the largest attack on Arab forces in history. The number of Arab casualties was unprecedented given the short time of the war. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost their lives in forty-four days.

     The "Mother of All Battles," or the Gulf war over controlling Kuwait, started on January 17 and ended on February 28, 1991. It resulted in the destruction of the major Iraqi military and civilian infrastructure, industry, and centers of gravity.[32] It also resulted in a huge number


of military and civilian casualties. General Schwarzkopf estimated that the number of the Iraqi soldiers who were killed reached one hundred thousand at the end of the air campaign and fifty thousand more at the end of the ground war.[33] Other estimates ranged between 50,000 and 220,000 (Chapter IX).

    Actually, the “Mother of All Battles” could have developed into a nuclear holocaust had the Iraqis used chemical weapons. General Powell and Secretary Cheney contemplated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in that occasion. The Israelis also were ready to retaliate with nuclear weapons if they were attacked by chemical weapons.[34] It was the Iraqi decision not to use unconventional weapons that saved Iraq and the region from total destruction.

     The war was an excessive “slaughter,” as described by Secretary Baker.[35] Even America=s allies, the British and the French, described it as “wanton killing.”[36] It was also “un-American” in the sense that thousands of Iraqi soldiers were killed while in retreat.[37] This was contrary to the assurances given by Baker to Aziz in Geneva that “Americans don=t shoot their adversaries in the back,”[38] and to President Bush=s announcement on February 24, 1991 that “the coalition forces would not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat.”[39]

     Despite the destruction and the huge loss in human life, many critics of the war wanted more killing, destruction,[40] and even the occupation of Iraq and the overthrow of its government.[41] Some of them criticized the President for declaring the cease-fire prematurely.[42] Others criticized him for not going far enough.[43] Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf were criticized for that “incomplete success.” Their critics claimed that in order for them to protect the image of the American military, they allowed half of the Republican Guard forces to withdraw without being destroyed.[44] 

     Reactions of these critics lead to several serious questions that most authors avoided. Was the destruction of Iraq and the huge number of Iraqi casualties inevitable, or intentional? Why weren't the Iraqi troops allowed to withdraw in order to avoid such destruction and casualties? In other words: Was the war really executed to force Iraq out of Kuwait, or to inflict maximum destruction on Iraq itself? And, why were leaders of the coalition determined to destroy Iraq? Chapter IX attempts to answer these and other related questions.

                  In Chapter X, the focus is on the terror campaign against Palestinians in Kuwait, after the War. This topic is missing from all the books that have been published in the West about the Gulf War. During the war, Americans as well as citizens in the other coalition countries were allowed to read, hear, and watch what the coalition military commanders wanted them to know. This happened as a result of a carefully controlled media coverage of the war.[45] The "smart" weapons were shown destroying Iraqi weapons and installations neatly. The coalition casualties were unbelievably low and some of them were even caused by friendly fire.[46] However, the media generally avoided covering the Iraqi casualties or the degree of destruction inflicted on Iraq. The exception was when Peter Arnett, the CNN correspondent, reported on the civilian shelter in downtown Baghdad, which was hit by two "smart" bombs killing hundreds of civilians. President Bush was still bitter about that report years after the war, as he mentioned it in his PBS interview in January 1996 and in his 1998 book.[47]

     The media also rarely reported on the terror campaign against Palestinians, Bedoons, and other Arab immigrants in Kuwait, which was conducted directly after the war. In fact, the Kuwaiti terror campaign was may be attributed to pre-war conditions than to the formal Palestinian support for Iraq. During the two decades that preceded the 1990 invasion, Kuwaitis demonstrated their will to get rid of the Palestinians but they were waiting for a pretext to do so.[48] When the Palestinian leadership expressed its support for the Iraqi “linkage” initiative, the Kuwaiti government found the excuse it was looking for to force Palestinians out of the country. The campaign started as threats by Kuwaiti officials in-exile,[49] then was carried out by Kuwaiti police and armed forces after the war.[50] 

     Thus, when Americans were euphoric, celebrating victory over the Third World country of Iraq, Kuwaitis were heavily involved in persecuting Palestinians in the country. Thousands of innocent Palestinian civilians were taken from their homes and from the streets to police stations and detention centers. There, they were tortured, raped, and killed for no reason other than being Palestinians.

    The killing and torture of Palestinians in Kuwait was happening with full knowledge of the coalition governments. The Kuwaiti terror campaign was rarely reported by the media or in government briefings. Even when they published their books about the war, neither President Bush nor any other officials in his administration mentioned anything concerning the Kuwaiti atrocities.[51] Chapter X addresses these atrocities against Palestinians, showing that Kuwaitis were not the victims that they were portrayed to be.[52]

                  In Chapter XI, the Gulf War is assessed in terms of its consequences on the Middle East and the United States. In particular, the War influences on democracy, Cold War, militarism, and the Middle East peace are analyzed. The first part of the Chapter deals with the way war decisions are made in America. An emphasis is on the role played by non-elected officials, which poses serious questions about democracy in America. Another part of the Chapter focuses on how proponents of war in the United States have been pushing for a new Cold War to replace Cold War I against communism. This time, Muslims are suggested to be the new enemies. Then, an analysis of the main negative consequences of the war follows, particularly how the War victims have continued to suffer inside Iraq, even a decade after the War. The Chapter includes an assessment of human rights conditions, democracy, and militarism in Arabia.




[1]. Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 340, 371, 388, 467).

[2]. Baker (1995: 267-269); Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 305-307).

[3]. Graz (1990); Daneshku (1990); Salinger and Laurent (1991: 31).

[4]. The first was in 1901, the second in 1902, and the third in

  1961 (Al-Rashid, 1960: 127-27; Dickson, 1956: 136-41;

  Joudhah, 1964: 61-67; Asiri, 1990: 7).

[5]. Bin Sultan (1995: 183-84); Pimlott (1992: 41-46); Salinger and

   Laurent (1991: 90-113).

[6]. Al-Iktissad Al-Arabi (61), July 1981: 23-27.


[7]. Fighting in Al-Jahra, in 1920 and disputes following Al-

   Uqair Conference in 1922 (Dickson, 1956: 148-155, 250-257;

   Joudah, 1964: 116-147).


[8]. Alessa (1981: 16-18); Brand (1988); Russell (1989); Shah and

   Al-Qudsi (1989); Farah et al. (1980); Human Rights Watch (1995).

[9]. Middle East Watch (1991: 51-53); Human Rights Watch (1995: 66-


[10]. Al-Shahi (1993: 10-11); Ghabra (1987: 34-37, 54, 58); Alessa

   (1981: 16-18, 106-111).

[11]. Al-Sabah, Su=ad (1983: 28); Al-Sabah, Youssif (1980: 138-139);

    Lubbadah (1992); Russell (1989); Farah et al. (1980).

[12]. Lubbadah (1991); USA Today (June 17, 1991); Los Angeles Times

    (June 3, 1991); The Christian Science Monitor (August 2, 1991);

    Ghabra (1991: 13); The Boston Globe (March 1, 1991); The

    Atlanta Journal and Constitution (march 4, 1991); Roth (1991:

    21-22, 98);

[13]. Ghareeb (1981);Yassin (1995: 37, 49-51); Al-Barrak (1989: 27-

    37, 63-85, 98-105, 205-253); Al-Bazzaz (1989); Timmerman

   (1991: 17-19); O=Ballance (1996: 93).

[14]. Ghareeb (1990: 29-32); Al-Farzali (1982: 23-43, 123-133).

[15]. Powell (1995: 459).

[16]. Center for Defense Information (1996).

[17]. Graz (1990).

[18]. Graz (1990); Daneshku (1990); Salinger and Laurent (1991: 31).

[19]. Jaber (1990); Pimlott (1992: 40); Bin Sultan (1995: 158-59);

    Al-Yahya (1993: 84, 113).

[20]. Bin Sultan (1995: 183-84); Pimlott (1992: 41-46); Salinger

    and Laurent (1991: 90-113).

[21]. Cipkowski (1992: 57).


[22]. The entire famous July 25, 1990 Glaspie-Saddam interview is documented in Sciolino (1991: 271-292). The most important sentence “But we have no opinion on inter-Arab disputes, like your dispute with Kuwait,” is on page 280.


[23]. Pimlott (1992: 37).

[24]. Timmerman (1991: 377-79, 387-88).

[25]. Baker (1995: 278-79); Powell (1995: 467).

[26]. Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 256); Baker (1995: 6, 10);

[27]. Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 319-320); Baker (1995: 279).

[28]. Baker (1995: 305).

[29]. Whitaker (1991); Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 292-293 362, 365,


[30]. Lubbadah (1991: 44-45); The Guardian (April 19, 1991).


[31] These included, by order, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Terrence O’Donnell, James Schlesinger, David Jones, William Crowe, Henry Kissinger, James Webb, Edward Luttwak, Richard Perle, Christine Helms, James Placke, Phebe Marr, William Odom, Gary Milhollin, William Graham, and Leonard Spector.


[32]. "Centers of gravity" was the term used by American military planners in referring to all the non-military Iraqi targets they intended to destroy during the air campaign, such as the industrial and economic institutions, highways, bridges, and buildings (Bin Sultan, 1995).


[33]. Schwarzkopf (1992: 441-42).

[34]. Powell (1995: 486, 503-4, 511-12); Levrani (1997: 68).

[35]. Baker (1995: 436).

[36]. Schwarzkopf (1992: 467-69).

[37]. Powell (1995: 517); Schwarzkopf (1992: 466); Baker (1995: 409-10).

[38]. Baker (1995: 360).

[39]. Baker (1995: 410).

[40]. Yetive (1997: 44).

[41]. Gordon and Tainor (1995: 447).

[42]. Cipkowski (1992: 153).

[43]. Brown and Shukman (1991: 180).

[44]. Gordon and Trainor (1995: x, xii, xiv).


[45]. The Pentagon controlled the media coverage of the war through combat pools, which allowed selected groups of friendly journalists to go to particular areas to report on (Yetive, 1997: 130-131).


[46]. Among the 144 Amercans, 10 British, and two French who were killed in the war, 16 deaths resulted from friendly fire (Cipkowski, 1992: 157-158).


[47]. Bush and Scowcroft (1998: 469-70); Schwarzkopf (1992: 435).

[48]. Shah and Al-Qudsi (1989: 22); Farah et al. (1989: 33-40);

    Russell (1989).

[49]. Fisk, Robert of the Independent (February 21, 1991).

[50]. Lubbadah (1991: 113-116); Healy (1991: 47); Roth (1991: 11).


[51]. Bush and Scowcroft (1998), Baker (1995), Powell (1995), and Schwarzkopf (1992). Even the Saudi commander Bin Sultan (1995) followed the same policy of complete silence concerning the Kuwaiti terror campaign against Palestinian civilians after the war.

[52]. Palestinians of Kuwait were not the only victims of that war. Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilians suffered from the war and the invasion. Yemenis were mass-deported from Saudi Arabia, and many Arab immigrants suffered persecution on the hands of Kuwaitis, after the war.